

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.

NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE
COMBAT LOGISTICS COORDINATOR
IN THE YEAR 2010


by

Craig W. Turley

Commander, U. S. Navy

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



Signature:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Craig W. Turley", written over a horizontal line.

MAY
14 November 1997

Paper directed by Captain G. W. Jackson, USN
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "P. A. Roman", written over a horizontal line.

Faculty Advisor

16 May 97
Date

19970814 150

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): Naval Expeditionary Task Force Combat Logistics Coordinator in the Year 2010 (U)			
9. Personal Authors: CDR C.W.Turley, USA			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 19 May 1997	
12. Page Count: 22			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Naval Expeditionary Task Force Combat Logistics Coordinator in 2010			
15. Abstract: Naval Doctrine Command is developing, and the Navy and Marine Corps evaluating, an overarching concept for naval operations in the littorals by a Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF). Comprising a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the NETF will be a key part of a joint or multi-national force in 2010. The NETF might be an enabling force, or may even transition to a Joint Task Force (JTF). It is evident that "focused logistics" and "just-in-time logistics" will be key drivers for future sustained naval operations; in order for the NETF to conduct operations in the littorals, some form of sea-based logistic support will also be required. Although the Combat Logistics Coordinator (CLC) concept adequately meets the logistics needs of today's NETF, it may not in the future. The CLC position is the weak link in the evolving NETF organization. Possible alternatives to how the CLC role and functions might best be optimized in the future are explored in this paper.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841- 6461 6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

UNCLASSIFIED

ABSTRACT

Naval Doctrine Command is developing, and the Navy and Marine Corps evaluating, an overarching concept for naval operations in the littorals by a Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF). Comprising a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the NETF will be a key part of a joint or multi-national force in 2010. The NETF might be an enabling force, or may even transition to a Joint Task Force (JTF). It is evident that “focused logistics” and “just-in-time logistics” will be key drivers for future sustained naval operations; in order for the NETF to conduct operations in the littorals, some form of sea-based logistic support will also be required. Although the Combat Logistics Coordinator (CLC) concept adequately meets the logistics needs of today’s NETF, it may not in the future. The CLC position is the weak link in the evolving NETF organization. Possible alternatives to how the CLC role and functions might best be optimized in the future are explored in this paper.

INTRODUCTION

“Forward...from the Sea” emphasizes that the focus of U.S. naval operations has shifted toward forward littoral regions of the world.¹ Emanating from this vision is the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) concept, being developed by Naval Doctrine Command. Currently the Navy and Marine Corps are carrying out preliminary concept development and evaluation. The NETF will take advantage of the synergistic effect of the Navy-Marine Corps Team and capitalize on the inherent combat power. To do so, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations felt that the existing Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and Amphibious Doctrines needed “evolutionary change to address rapid planning/crisis response, to define functions in a joint context, to integrate shallow water undersea warfare, and to focus on Expeditionary Operations in the littoral.”²

As envisioned, the NETF will be forward deployed and include a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Appendix A contains details of the Task Force Organization. The NETF commander will normally be the CVBG Commander, rather than the ARG Commander. The NETF will operate across the full spectrum of naval operations, from presence through crisis. The operations may be fully integrated to include joint and/or combined/coalition warfare, including enabling operations. “Enabling operations are those operations that continue access for additional forces to arrive in theater, gain access for additional forces to arrive in theater, or secure access after other forces have departed the theater.”³ In case of a regional contingency, the NETF may need to grow into a large force such as a Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF), possibly composed of a multi-aircraft carrier force and a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). In addition, the NETF must be properly organized in order to be easily assimilated into a Joint Task Force, or be prepared to become a Joint Task Force.

As currently described in the NETF concept, the Combat Logistics Coordinator (CLC) is not a commander, but merely keeps the NETF Commander (CNETF) informed on all matters pertaining

to logistics requirements affecting ships of the task force. Current planning calls for the CLC to be the commanding officer of the combination oiler and ammunition ship (AOE), in company with the NETF CVBG/ARG/MEU, or secondarily the Amphibious Warfare Commander (AMWC). The CLC will perform only the following Navy logistics functions:

- plan and execute logistics policy
- plan logistics evolutions
- tactical air logistics coordination
- materiel control
- repair coordination underway replenishment coordination officer in charge of the evolution (OCE) during underway replenishment operations (UNREPs)⁴

He will not, however, coordinate Marine Corps logistics. The CLC's role is rather limited and not much different than that which the logistics coordinator historically has performed for a traditional 10 – 12 ship CVBG. The concept does not call for the CLC and Landing Force Commander (LFC) to have any interaction. Marine Corps doctrine requires that the LFC get all combat support and combat service support via Marine Corps channels. The Marines are apparently reluctant to rely on the Navy for logistics or combat service support. NDP-4, Naval Logistics, states that "... logistics support in joint and multinational operations traditionally has been the responsibility of each service."⁵

The CLC role in NETF activities appears to be mired in archaic inertia. This role is neither consistent with operational art, nor forward-looking to future needs. U.S. military logistics in the 21st Century will be defined by a significant wave of changes--informational, technological, doctrinal, and budgetary--which are already in development. In the context of such changes, the CLC is a weak link. This paper will demonstrate why this is so and offer alternative remedies.

BACKGROUND

In the future, the United States will not have the luxury of building up a base of supply, as was the case during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the wars of the future, the United States probably will not be able to rely upon the laborious and time consuming method of establishing, then protecting, huge support bases ashore. Furthermore, as was the case in Somalia, the logistics

infrastructure--airfields, ports, staging and storage areas, and roads--will not always be as sophisticated as in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, through-put of ammunition, supplies, materiel, and personnel will not be successful unless logistics and transportation improvements are made. It is also clear that joint "focused logistics" will receive much greater emphasis as commonality and cross servicing of all areas of logistic support will be maximized. This will be particularly true between the Navy and Marine Corps as they attempt to form a true Naval Service combat team.

FOCUSED LOGISTICS

Joint Vision 2010 is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept of joint operations in the future, and is the "conceptual template"⁶ for the evolution of the armed forces into the early part of the 21st Century. The vision describes four operational concepts: Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. "Responsive, flexible, and precise"⁷ logistics will underwrite the first three concepts. "Focused logistics" or "just-in-time logistics" is:

... the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even en route, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. It will be fully adaptive to the needs of our increasingly dispersed and mobile forces, providing support in hours or days, versus weeks. 'Focused logistics' will enable joint forces of the future to be more mobile, versatile, and projectable from anywhere in the world.⁸

"Just-in-time logistics" is highly dependent on well trained logisticians, and reliable and timely transportation. "Focused" or "just-in-time" logistics springs from strategic-level effort to develop a compensating methodology for the budget-driven necessity to reduce commodity inventories. Observation of the commercial sector transportation has suggested that the "just-in-time" process can be adapted to military requirements. It is worth noting that the next step--translating a strategic assumption into an operational and tactical reality--will be the giant one. To achieve an acceptable risk level will necessitate systems, people, and doctrine which do not yet exist throughout the services. Nonetheless, the strategic die is cast: what now does not exist must be created.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak, has advanced certain Joint Vision 2010 ideas in “Operational Maneuver From the Sea,” the Marine Corps’ operational concept for the future:

In the 21st century, the Navy-Marine team must field a more versatile, capable, and responsive naval power-projection capability....To do this, we need a force that blends high-technology and maneuver warfare with the advantages of sea basing. These requirements have given rise to the U.S. Marine Corps new operational concept: ‘Operational Maneuver from the Sea’ (OMFTS).⁹

Key tenets of this concept are “sea-based fire support, use of the sea as medium for tactical and operational movement, and sea-based logistics.”¹⁰

With respect to “focused logistics,” the Commandant envisions a logistics system that will be more streamlined and efficient than today. In order to extend the influence of operational mass, the naval logistics system must provide forces with “just-in-time logistics” during the entire mission. This “just-in-time logistics” will be critical to maintaining the operational tempo of the combat forces. Any breaks or pauses in the operation may be exploited by the adversary. In the future, the Navy and Marine Corps will require the following enhanced logistic capabilities:

- Assets and capabilities which are interchangeable, in order to use them in mutually supportive ways.
- A logistic system which provides support for operations over the wide range of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and full scale conflict.
- A logistics infrastructure which operates seamlessly in the joint and non-governmental organizational arena so there can be a smooth transition if required.¹¹

In the future, “just-in-time logistics” will play a key role in ensuring operational tempo, momentum, and the other tenets of operational art are maximized rather than constrained.

SEA-BASED LOGISTIC SUPPORT

“Forward...From the Sea” articulates the requirement for the Navy and Marine Corps team to be capable of “....operating from highly mobile ‘sea bases’ in forward areas....free of the political embraces that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land based operations in forward theaters.”¹² For the purpose of this paper, sea-based logistics will include both Navy and Marine

Corps logistics indigenous to the NETF or a NEF if constituted in the event of a major contingency. It will also include requisite combat service support for combatants ashore delivered from ships and other platforms of the future. By its design, it will be more Marine Corps- and transportation-intensive than Navy, and have the flexibility to support Army forces as well.

By reducing the logistics footprint ashore and operating farther to seaward, one reduces vulnerabilities to attack masked by littoral geography. In addition, operational mobility and agility will improve as sea-basing can significantly reduce the requirement for combat forces to protect logistic bases ashore, thus minimizing economy of effort needs. As stated in the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) concept paper dated 15 December 1996, sea-based logistics will require:

- technology to enhance logistics flow through use of asset tracking devices.
- automated processes, data transfer, selective offload capability and precision location/delivery.
- greater reliability in naval systems reducing maintenance and support.
- automated monitoring of military systems to indicate pending failures allowing reduction of spares in theater and reducing maintenance time.
- a planning process that will be enhanced through automated forecasting and seamless inventorying.
- reconstitution of a MAGTF at sea.¹³

Sea-basing Navy forces is not a new concept, as there is useful historical precedent. Floating bases were a vital link in the extensive logistics lines of operating forces in the Pacific theater during World War II. These bases consisted of various auxiliary ship types, depending on the mission. They included: Submarine and destroyer tenders, ammunition ships, hospital ships, water and fuel barges, oilers, salvage ships, storeships and the like. Naval Logistics states that the sea- bases performed three functions for the World War II commander: “Direct support to the forces afloat, a source and port of resupply for underway replenishment, and a pipeline stockpoint for fuel and ammunition and other consumables.”¹⁴

During the Vietnam conflict, a variety of coastal and riverine floating bases were developed to support boat and rotary wing actions. In the late 1980s, during Operation EARNEST WILL, Navy ships of Commander Middle East Force, with U.S. Army helicopters embarked, successfully utilized

an arrangement of floating barges as a home base for operational logistic support. Sea-based logistics was used due to regional Arab sensitivities and political constraints of the day.

In addition to “focused logistics” which will be in place in 2010, some equally important Marine Corps equipment will be operational. They are the MV-22 Osprey and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). The MV-22 is a short-takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft which will replace the aging CH-46 and CH-53. Its range and load capacities will be much improved over either existing aircraft. The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) will provide extended over-the-horizon assault capability, thus protecting Navy shipping from sophisticated sea-based mine threats and land-based anti-shipping missile threats. The AAAV will complement the existing Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). The MV-22, AAAV, and LCAC form the “OMFTS Triad.”¹⁵

Two existing Aviation Logistics Support (T-AVB) ships and thirteen Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships can also provide much sea-based logistics support and flexibility to the NETF or NEF commander, but not in their current load configurations nor, apparently, in the range of capabilities envisioned for the future. Major Stebbins reports in “Sea-based Logistics: Evolution of a Revolution” that the feasibility of converting a very large crude carrier (VLCC) into a very large mobile offshore base (VLMOB) is being explored as a means to address this shortfall in capability.¹⁶ In addition, Navy Times reports that “Boeing Corporation and Kvaerner ASA, Europe’s largest shipbuilder, will study building a huge offshore air base....[T]he two companies will prepare a feasibility study for a 5,300- foot floating runway and troop carrier.”¹⁷

The “OMFTS Triad” will be a significant advance in amphibious warfare which historically has been launched from five to ten miles from the beach depending on the terrain and threat. Under the OMFTS concept, AAAVs will deploy at a minimum standoff range of 25 nautical miles, LCACs at 40 nautical miles, the V-22 aircraft at 50 nautical miles or greater, and the aircraft carrier, command ship, and big deck amphibious ships in the NETF or NEF at distances greater than 100

naautical miles from land.¹⁸ If implemented, this doctrinal advance will allow the NETF/NEF to better avoid diesel submarine, mine, missile boat, small aircraft, and terrorist threats.

NAVY LOGISTICS

The Navy logistics system provides operating forces with “supply, transportation, health services, maintenance, engineers, and other services.”¹⁹ Navy logistics flows from CONUS based strategic stockpiles via commercially chartered merchant ships to Advanced Support Bases (ASB). From the ASB, commodities are delivered either directly to the fleet or to a Forward Logistics Site (FLS), by a single product shuttle ship. Establishment of a FLS is situation dependent. Within a battle group or battle force, the key tactical logistics provider is a multi-product station ship, such as an AOE, which is typically assigned to a single CVBG/ARG or to a single NETF.

The above process reflects the flow of logistics to the tactical operating forces in peacetime. In wartime, one only needs to expand the concept when supporting a force larger than a single NETF. A NEF would simply require an expanded transportation system to accommodate greater logistic expenditure by the increased number of ships. For example, shuttle ships might operate in a multiple ship Underway Replenishment Group (URG) to provide requisite logistics support to a NEF. In addition, a FLS would probably be established to provide stockpiling of logistics well forward in-theater to meet the needs of the larger force.

By design, Navy forces operating at sea are for all practical purposes self-sustaining. Through coordination by the CLC, much of this sea-based logistic support is already provided at the tactical level, and will be provided in the future as well. Presuming that a multi-product station ship is assigned, a typical modern battle group carries fuel for approximately 20-30 days, consumables other than fuel and ordnance for 75 days, spare parts for 90 days, and ordnance quantities dependent on the mission.²⁰

Current logistics initiatives associated with Joint Vision 2010, “Forward...from the Sea,” and “Operational Maneuver From the Sea” will mean that force consumable and spare parts inventories will be greatly reduced in the future, limiting the CLC’s flexibility. It will be imperative that the CLC’s planning and coordination be superb. There will be little room for error as CONUS logistics stocks will operate on the margin due to cost savings measures initiated in the early 1990s.

During at-sea operations, the Navy’s Combat Logistic Force (CLF) shuttle and station ships provide the primary replenishment support to the fleet. The CLF includes both Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, although in the future almost all CLF ships will be MSC - operated. This will occur as the AOE-6 Class transitions to the MSC for cost saving reasons. The MSC - operated ships are not commanded by Navy officers, but by civilian mariners. When that occurs, CLC responsibility cannot be vested in the underway replenishment ship unless US Navy Regulations are changed to bestow coordination authority upon civilian mariners.

MARINE CORPS LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The Marine Corps projects power through the deployment and employment of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) combined arms. MAGTFs are composed of various sized elements including infantry, artillery, armor, engineer, reconnaissance, aviation, and logistics components. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, have the same basic structure to include: Command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and combat service support element (CSSE). The CSSE provides supply, landing support, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other miscellaneous services.

MAGTFs can be as large as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of approximately 50,000 – 60,000 Marines, endowed with 60 days of sustainment.²¹ There are currently three standing MEFs, and each is composed of a Marine Division, a Marine Air Wing (MAW), and a Force Service Support Group (FSSG). A MAGTF can be as small as the 600 man Special MAGTF embarked on the USS

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN- 71) in 1993. Most, however, are MEU sized at approximately 2,000 – 2,200 Marines. Three MEUs are routinely employed with 15 days of combat service support capability at any given point in time.²²

The key to Marine Corps logistics, for any MAGTF, is vested in the combat service support (CSS) element. For example, in a MEU sized MAGTF, logistics are provided by the MEU service support group (MSSG) commanded by an O-4. However, in the case of a MEF, logistics are provided by the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) commanded by a Brigadier General. It is the responsibility of the combat service support element, regardless of MAGTF size, to provide all logistics support to the MAGTF through the course of its existence.

CLC COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

The NETF Concept is still evolving; however, one may assume that while the NETF will be designed as an integrated CVBG/ARG/MEU, it will have to be able to expand in order to accommodate a MEF sized MAGTF, mine counter-measure forces, a hospital ship, maritime prepositioning squadrons, T-AVBs, and possibly a version of a VLMOB or other large sea-based platform. The sea-based force should be able to seamlessly accept additional Marine Corps and Army troops and materiel as the mission expands. The NETF concept stipulates that command and control procedures put in place for normal peacetime operations must be able to “transition smoothly to a larger joint/combined operation; make the sea/land boundary transparent; and minimize re-organization during different phases of a planned campaign.”²³

It is apparent that the NETF organizational infrastructure must be flexible to accommodate different force size, make-up, and role. The NETF’s Combat Logistics Coordinator is the Achilles heel in the NETF organization. One could argue that the NETF command and control apparatus does permit each Service to effectively provide for own current logistics requirements during normal peacetime operations when the ARG and CVBG are often operating apart. It will not, however, meet

the needs of the sea-based Navy-Marine Corps Team in 2010. As previously discussed, the logistic playing field will have completely changed with the incorporation of “focused logistics” and sea-based logistics.

CLC LIMITATIONS

NDP-4 stipulates that “logistics is the responsibility of the operational commander, who must ensure that his operations and logistic experts integrate their operation and logistic plans”²⁴

Doctrine goes on to say that detailed operational logistic planning should at least:

- Earmark significant time-phased support requirements.
- Identify transportation requirements to support the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
- Outline the capabilities and limitations of ports, including the Logistics-Over-The-Shore capability to respond to normal and expanded requirements.
- Recognize support methods and procedures required to meet the needs of the sea, air, and land lines of communications.
- Coordinate and control movement into the contingency area.
- Develop reasonable logistics assumptions.
- Define the extent of needed host nation resources.
- Identify the engineering and construction requirements for sustainability.
- Consider the meteorologic and oceanographic limitations .²⁵

Even carrying out these operational logistics planning requirements today, while providing day to day logistic support to NETF ships, is a tall order for the NETF organization. The CLC is assisted by the small N-4 organizations on the CVBG and ARG staffs; each is normally headed by a senior LCDR. In this construct, unity of command is not present and unity of effort is a result of the personalities involved.

“Focused logistics” and sea-based logistics of the future will exert great demands on the CLC and battle group N-4 organizations, which they probably will not be able to handle unless augmented. Setting up and coordinating transportation of logistic support to the NETF alone, within the NETF’s area of operation, and to Marines ashore will take up a great deal of the organization’s time and effort. After all, timely and reliable transportation is the enabler for “just-in-time logistics” to succeed.

Nor does the present organization call for the CLC and the LFC SSG to coordinate logistics matters. Due to the ongoing drive for efficiencies in the naval logistic system--reduced redundancy, commonality of support, and cross servicing of materiel and transportation--this CLC - LFC disconnect appears wholly out of touch with strategic initiatives. If the NETF commander were required to expand the NETF to the naval component of a JTF or a JTF (Forward), he would have a very difficult time because of the weak CLC organization.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

Commander T. J. McKearney, in "CNEF Arriving," recommends that a permanent Naval Expeditionary Force Command be created to lead Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEFs), rather than the NEF being commanded on an ad hoc basis by the numbered Fleet Commander. His recommendation may be overly ambitious, as it would take a large paradigm shift by the Fleet Commanders and the Marine Expeditionary Force Commanders to allow this to occur. He does, however, make a strong case of the need for additional personnel support for the Combat Logistics Coordinator in operations more intensive than forward presence. In his plan, sea-based logistics would be the responsibility of a Sea-based Logistics Cell, headed by a Navy post CLF ship command O-6, or an O-5 Marine Corps Logistics Officer. Other key personnel would include a USN Supply Corps Officer, a USN Engineering Duty Officer, an Aviation Maintenance Officer, a Civil Engineering Corps Officer, a USN Boatswain's Mate, a USMC Embarkation Specialist, and other junior USN and USMC enlisted members in various specialties.²⁶ This staff, as envisioned by CDR McKearney, is rather top heavy in rank structure, but it does include both Marine Corps and Navy logistics expertise.

CDR McKearney's recommendation is right on track, as he makes a quality case to deal up front with the problem. However, it may take more radical changes than he proposes to solve, not only the near term problems but future challenges as well. An alternative concept would be to have

an existing plan for the replacement of the CLC with a flag officer and supporting staff, embarking the sea-based NETF well before operations expand to a JTF-sized operation. As a precondition, periodic training would have already been conducted, and adequate staff space, planning tools, and communication circuits designated in order for the option to work. Realizing that the existing CLC is the weak link in the NETF operation, a detailed embarkation plan will need to be sitting on the shelf awaiting execution.

This plan should be the responsibility of the numbered Fleet Commander working with the MEF in the geographic area. For example, in a Korean scenario, prior to the Japan-based NETF setting sail for the Korean Peninsula, either the III MEF FSSG Commander in Okinawa or the USN Logistics Group Commander in Singapore should deploy with the NETF as the CLC. Once this Flag Officer has turned over pertinent responsibilities with the existing CLC, the Admiral would become a Combat Logistics Commander. The particulars of what this entails would be a function of the NEF commander's desires. In any case, the Combat Logistics Commander would be on an equal footing with the other commanders in the NEF, such as the Sea Control Commander (SCC) and the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). On any given day, the Combat Logistics Commander may command zero units or as many as two URGs, depending on the size of the force and the scope of the operation. Making this position a commander vice a coordinator ensures unity of effort and affords the position command legitimacy.

A decision regarding which Flag or General Officer would become the Combat Logistics Commander will depend on the expected role of the NEF, and the NEF commander's wishes. If a Marine is chosen to be the Combat Logistics Commander, then the FSSG Commander would become the Combat Logistics Commander, and the CLC deputy would be the Chief of Staff from the Combat Logistics Group. The FSSG deputy would remain in Okinawa running the remainder of the organization until deployed. The bulk of the CLC's staff would come from the FSSG staff with augmentation provided as necessary from either the Seventh Fleet staff or the Combat Logistics

Group staff. The Commanding Officer of the AOE, the CVBG N-4, the ARG N-4, and the MSSG would continue executing tactical unit logistics support.

When this plan is executed, the Combat Logistics Commander would report directly to the NETF Commander concerning all matters regarding operational logistics, and be responsible for:

- (1) Joint Logistics
- (2) Inter-theater sea and airlift scheduling
- (3) Intra-theater lift coordination and execution
- (4) Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) integration
- (5) Logistic requirements for MAGTF integration
- (6) T-AVB integration
- (7) Fleet Hospital Ship integration
- (8) Fleet and force operational logistics planning and execution

It is acknowledged that this plan would initially interfere with the day-to-day operations of the augmenting staffs; however, the operational benefits far outweigh the drawbacks. The Combat Logistics Commander's staff would have both the resident expertise and horsepower to ably plan and coordinate sea-based logistics. Further, backfill of logistics billets ashore, vacant because of personnel going afloat with the NETF, may be accomplished with trained Reserve Component logisticians who already exist.

There is one other very important consideration to be made when opting for the expanded role of the Combat Logistics Commander, and that is how the Combat Logistics Commander will work with, fit into, or possibly even lead a future Theater Logistics Command and Control organization. Based on the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Provide Hope, the JCS and CINCs have determined that there is a need for some type of Theater Logistics Command organization during large scale operations. There are two options being explored by the JCS and CINCs' J-4s. Option 1 would use an existing support organization from one Service and empower it

to control all common user resources in theater. For example, the Army, under Lieutenant General Pagonis, was in charge of the de facto Theater Logistics Command during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The second option calls for a Joint Logistics Management Command to function as a headquarters element directly under the CINC. This organization would be in a cadre status during peacetime, but would expand through augmentation by various Service staffs in wartime.²⁷

If either option is put into doctrine, it will impact the Navy-Marine Corps team's ability to provide adequate logistics to the Fleet and Force. In order for the sea-based NETF/NEF of the future to get its fair share of ammunition, fuel, and common user sealift and airlift, the CLC position will have to be much more robust and effective. An AOE commanding officer filling the CLC position will not be able to realistically provide operational logistics support to the force, due to inadequate staff and C2 facilities to plan, coordinate, and execute the mission. Additionally, the CNETF/CNEF will not have the resident expertise or capability to be able to control all common user resources in theater if designated as the commander of the Theater Logistics Command. If Option 2 is adopted as joint doctrine, the existing CLC will be unable to be a strong advocate for all naval forces. Augmentation of the NETF by insertion of a Combat Logistics Commander in place of the Combat Logistics Coordinator, in times of crisis, will give the Naval Service this opportunity.

CONCLUSION

Several cost saving, informational, technological, and doctrinal advances are being implemented in the Navy and Marine Corps, such as "focused logistics," "just-in-time logistics," and sea-based logistics. These advances make it imperative that future CLCs, AMWCs, and LFCs work very closely together with respect to logistic support during peacetime operations. Inventory and transportation assets will be limited, and apportionment and allocation of scarce resources will be complex and difficult. The Command and Control organization for Combat Logistics is adequate for today's operations, but will be hard pressed to meet the demands likely to be placed upon it in 2010.

Splitting logistics responsibilities and functions between the CLC (Navy logistics) and LFC (Marine Corps logistics) is insupportable for two reasons. Cost efficiencies in the naval logistics system--reduced inventories, commonality of support, and cross servicing of materiel and transportation--make this separation cost-inefficient. More importantly, Service-split logistics activities within an integrated NETF/NEF imply a duplication of efforts and assets which is impractical, illogical, and not conducive to effective combat operations.

A possible alternative as to how the CLC role and functions might expand in the future to best coordinate Navy and Marine sea-based logistics was explored. The recommended alternative will take advantage of the Combat Logistics Commander's experience and legitimacy to properly provide for naval forces operating in the joint environment. Augmentation of the NETF with a strong staff of Marine and Navy logisticians, and replacement of the Combat Logistics Coordinator with a Combat Logistics Commander, as the need arises, will provide the best opportunity for operational success in the future.

NOTES

¹ U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea (Washington, DC: December 1996), 2.

² U.S. Department of the Navy, "Naval Expeditionary Task Force Command and Control," Naval Doctrine Command Concept Paper (Norfolk, VA: August 1996), 3-1-1.

³ Ibid., 3-XVI.

⁴ Ibid., 3-13-1 – 3-13-2.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Logistics (Washington, DC: January 1995), 53.

⁶ U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: 1996), 1.

⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁹ Charles C. Krulak, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1997, 27.

¹⁰ Ibid., 28.

¹¹ Ibid., 30.

¹² U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea, 5.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Navy, "Operations in the Littoral," Naval Doctrine Command Concept Paper (Norfolk, VA: 15 December 1996), 12.

¹⁴ George C. Dyer, Naval Logistics (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1960), 123.

¹⁵ Krulak, 31.

¹⁶ Byron F. Stebbins, "Sea-based Logistics: Reaching...From the Sea," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, 14 June 1997, 12.

¹⁷ "Ideas Floated For Offshore Navy Base," Navy Times, 12 May 1997, 2.

¹⁸ Mark W. Beddoes, "Logistical Implications of Operational Maneuver From the Sea," Unpublished Research Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1997, 4.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Logistics, 18.

²⁰ Ibid., 64.

²¹ U.S. Marine Corps, FMFRP 2-12. Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability (Washington, DC: April 1991), 18.

²² Ibid., 34.

²³ U.S. Department of the Navy, "Naval Expeditionary Task Force Command and Control," 3-1-2.

²⁴ U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Logistics, 34.


²⁵ Ibid., 35.

²⁶ T.J. McKearney, "CNEF Arriving," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1997, 38.

²⁷ Facsimile from James Dell, Naval Doctrine Command, Minutes of Logistics Integration Conference, 2-4 December 1996, 22 April 1997, 1.

APPENDIX A

Naval Expeditionary Task Force



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beddoes, Mark W. "Logistical Implications of Operational Maneuver From the Sea." Unpublished Research Paper, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: March 1997.
- Brabham, James A. "Operational Logistics: Defining the Art of the Possible." Marine Corps Gazette, April 1994, 26-31.
- Dyer, George C. Naval Logistics. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1960.
- Eccles, Henry E. Logistics in the National Defense. Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1959.
- Facsimile from James Dell, Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk, VA, Minutes Of Logistics Integration Conference, 2-4 December 1996, 22 April, 1-12.
- Krulak, Charles C. "Operational Maneuver From the Sea." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1997, 26-31.
- McKearney, T.J. "CNEF Arriving." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1997, 36-40.
- "Ideas Floated For Offshore Navy Base." Navy Times, 12 May 1997, p. 2.
- Quist, Burton C. "Naval Expeditionary Warfare Update." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1996, 38-41.
- Rengstroff, C.A. "Naval Operational Logistics: Reaching...From the Sea." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 9 November 1996.
- Stebbins, Byron F. "Sea-based Logistics: Evolution of a Revolution." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport RI: 14 June 1996.
- U.S. Department of the Navy. Expeditionary Logistics...A Strategic Plan for Navy and Marine Corps 21st Century Logistics. Washington, D.C.: February 1997.
- U.S. Department of the Navy. Forward...From the Sea. Washington, D.C. : 1994.
- U.S. Department of the Navy. Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Logistics. Washington, D.C. January 1995.
- U.S. Department of the Navy. "Naval Expeditionary Task Force Command and Control." Naval Doctrine Command Concept Paper, Norfolk, VA: August 1996.
- U.S. Department of the Navy. "Operations in the Littoral." Naval Doctrine Command Concept Paper. Norfolk, VA: 15 December 1996.

U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
Washington, D.C.: 27 January 1995.

U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Vision 2010, CJCS, Washington, D.C.: 1996.

U.S. Marine Corps. FMFRP 2-12, Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability.
Washington, D.C.: April 1991.